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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a multi-period, dynamic programming model of household choices 
on savings, consumption, having children and helping to fund children's education.  Data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey young women cohort are used to estimate the 
parameters of the model.  The full structural model is estimated using a simulated 
maximum likelihood procedure utilizing the dynamic programming model solution to 
create simulated data samples from which nonparametric kernel estimators are used to 
construct the densities in the likelihood.  The estimated model is able to match the 
general trends in the NLS data, particularly as related to the interaction between children, 
savings and spending on education.  The life-cycle paths of these choices suggest that 
parents do save to help make sizeable transfers to their children, and that making such 
choices endogenous is important.  Furthermore, the parameter estimates indicate that the 
amount that parents choose to contribute to a child’s education has a strong impact on the 
probability that a child attains a college degree, as does the level of education of the 
parents.  Using the estimated model, policy experiments are performed to look at the 
impact of additional government grants for college education, tax credits for college 
spending and the creation of tax-free education savings accounts on parental savings, 
contributions toward education, and the education attainment of children.  While all of 
the policies increase net contributions to children and increase the probability that a child 
attains a college degree, the grants and education savings accounts are found to be the 
most effective.  In addition, both policies are actually found to have a greater impact on 
children with less educated parents. 
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1. Introduction 
In the U.S., it is common for parents to help pay for their children’s college education 
and for many families this is a major expense that they face and must plan for.  The cost 
of a college degree is also very large.  The National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) reports that the average full price (including tuition, room, board and other 
expenses as reported by universities) for a private 4-year school was $23,600 per year for 
the 2000-2001 academic year (Berkner, Berker et al. 2002).  The cost for a public 4-year 
school was still $12,600.  Furthermore, these costs have been rising rapidly.  The 
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education between the 2001-2002 
academic year and the 2002-2003 academic year, tuition levels have increased by 7 
percent nationally, and by as much as 24 percent in Massachusetts and 20 percent in 
Texas (Kronholz 2003). Certainly some of this is paid for by student aid through grants, 
scholarships, and subsidized loans.  Still, the NCES reports that 45 percent of students 
receive no type of aid, either from grants, subsidized loans, or otherwise.  McPherson and 
Shapiro (1991) estimate that those receiving such aid, the aid only covers 75% of the cost 
of public schooling and 50% of the cost of private schooling.  As such, it does fall upon 
the family to help pay for college expenses.  Using data gathered by the NCES, Choy and 
Henke (1992) find that in 1989, 67% of parents contributed to their children’s college 
education and the average annual amount was $3,900 ($5,240 in 1999 dollars, adjusted 
using the CPI). 
Given the high costs of education, the fact that most children need support from 
their parents to attain a college degree, and the importance of a college degree in 
determining future earnings and productivity, there has been in recent years a push to 
help parents pay for their children’s college education.  In the last five years, there has 
been an introduction of a variety of policies not only aiming to lower the cost of a degree 
for some children, but also aiming to increase the amount that parents contribute toward 
the college education of their children.  Such parental contributions toward education can 
have differing impacts on savings.  First, it may increase savings early in life if parents 
plan to spend money on their children’s education.  Working in the other direction, 
however, is the negative impact of the additional cost of raising children.  Lastly, at the 
time of the transfer and beyond, assets may change their rate of growth.  To fully 
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examine the impact of policies on parental contributions, then, it is necessary to consider 
parents decisions on fertility, savings and college spending together. 
This paper estimates a structural dynamic programming model of household 
decisions on having children, saving and making transfers to children in the form of 
educational funding.  The model allows for households to face income uncertainty and 
borrowing constraints, assumes that households save to smooth consumption.  In 
choosing to have children, households gain in utility, but incur costs to raise children.  
Additional utility is gained from having children receive a college degree, and parents 
can influence this by offering to help pay for college.  Taken together, there are several 
motives for households to save:  precautionary, liquidity constrained, consumption 
smoothing for retirement and the provision of inter-vivos transfers to children in the form 
of paying for college.  The model is estimated using a simulated maximum likelihood 
procedure and data from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) young women cohort.  
The estimated model is then used to examine policy experiments aimed to replicate an 
increase in grants for children attending college, an increase in tax credit for parental 
spending on education, and the creation of tax-free college savings accounts. 
The second section of the paper presents a review of relevant previous studies to 
give a background upon which the current model is based.  The third section of the paper 
describes the model and estimation procedure in detail.  A general life-cycle model is 
developed with the addition of choices on having children and helping to pay for their 
education and a specification is presented that will be estimated here.  The section also 
discusses the issues associated with solving the model and the numerical technique used.  
The section concludes with a description of the simulated maximum likelihood procedure 
that is used to estimate the model.  Section four describes the data, both in terms of how 
the variables in the model are constructed and descriptive statistics of the sample used.  
Section five presents the estimated parameter results and discusses the fit of the estimated 
model.  Section six provides a discussion of using the estimated model to examine policy 
experiments aimed at capturing the impact of grants, tax credits and tax-free education 
savings accounts on both parental contributions and the education attainment of their 
children.  
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2.  Background and Previous Literature 
The workhorse for economic research on household intertemporal savings and 
consumption decisions is the life-cycle model.  A very thorough review of the history of 
these models and their ability to deal with observed microeconomic facts can be found in 
Browning and Lusardi (1996).  The life-cycle framework takes its original inspirations 
from Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), but has evolved significantly through the years.  
The basic underlying tenet of these models is that forward-looking households will try to 
equate their marginal utilities across different periods by smoothing consumption across 
their lifetime.  The original framework progressed into what is widely referred to as the 
Certainty-Equivalence (CEQ) model that dominated much of the research from the mid 
1970’s through the late 1980’s. 
The validity of the CEQ model has been debated and tested for years.  Generally 
speaking, there are several empirical shortcomings from the predictions of the CEQ-
model (for summaries see Hubbard, Skinner et al. 1994; Browning and Lusardi 1996; 
Coleman 1998).  The additions of precautionary savings and liquidity constraints to the 
life-cycle framework have been both successful and rather widely accepted 
improvements in life-cycle models (see for example and review Hubbard, Skinner et al. 
1994; Hubbard, Skinner et al. 1995).  These models are complicated by the fact that they 
can in general no longer be analytically solved and must therefore rely on numerical 
solution techniques.  Several sources of uncertainty confronting households have been 
studied in these precautionary models.  Early studies of precautionary savings allow for 
earnings risk (Skinner 1988; Zeldes 1989; Caballero 1991; Deaton 1991), lifetime 
uncertainty (Hubbard and Judd 1987; Hurd 1989) and even uncertainty regarding medical 
expenses (Kotlikoff 1989). The general finding in these studies is that the precautionary 
and liquidity constrained models do a better job of accounting for the micro facts in the 
data than the CEQ model.  The borrowing constraint prevents households from 
borrowing to consume more, even when that would be optimal, and this allows for an 
increased correlation between income and consumption.  Furthermore, the precautionary 
motive encourages households to save a “buffer stock”. 
While there is strong evidence that households do face liquidity constraints, the 
previous discussion of the debate on this illustrates, there are other choices that 
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households make that are related to savings and consumtion decisions that are ignored 
by life-cycle model.  It has been pointed out  (for example see Browning and Lusardi 
1996; Keane and Wolpin 2001) that life cycle models really need to account for a whole 
range of related behavior including not only consumptions and savings decisions but also 
occupational (including work, leisure and retirement decisions) and fertility decisions.  In 
particular, findings that demographic equivalency scales can help reconcile model 
predictions to the data, as noted by Attanasio and Browning (1995), indicate the 
importance of family size in considering the evidence.  However, as Keane and Wolpin 
point out, such scales are “fundamentally arbitrary” and just indicate that standard models 
can fit the data fairly well “by allowing for enough interactions between consumptions 
and household demographics in the utility function (Keane and Wolpin 2001, p. 1058).” 
In fact, a major shortcoming of life-cycle models when considering family size is that the 
number and timing of children is either taken as given or as the result of a random, 
exogenous process.  Coleman claims the lack of allowing for “the endogeneity of the 
overall relationship between family structure, family income, family consumptions and 
age,” is one of the “greatest weakness[es] in the current state of theory (Coleman 1998, p. 
8).”  Furthermore, Browning and Lusardi add that it “would be extremely interesting to 
extend these studies … to allow for the fact that, to a certain extent, agents choose … the 
time path of demographics.  Thus high education agents marry later and start their 
families later which may be connected to their income processes (Browning and Lusardi 
1996, pp. 1807-8).”  
There can be no denying that the consumption and savings behavior of families 
will differ depending on the number of children in the family.  For starters, children 
undoubtedly cost money.  Using data from the 1990-1992 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CES) and adjusting the amounts to 1997 dollars using the CPI, Lino (1998) calculates 
the average annual expense for the younger child, under age 18, in a two-child household 
for different household income brackets.  He calculates the expense ranges from $5,820 
to $6,880 depending on the age of the child (the amount increases as children grow) for 
households with 1997 pre-tax income less than $35,5001.  This average increases to a 
1 The costs include data on child specific expenses on clothing, child care and education and estimated 
portions of expenses on housing, transportation, food, health care and miscellaneous expenditures. 
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range of $8,060 to $9,170 for households with income between $35,500 and $59,700 
and to $11,990 to $13,260 for households with income greater than $59,700.  These 
amounts average 14% to 28% of a household’s pre-tax income depending on the pre-tax 
income bracket of the household.  These explicit costs, of course, do not include any 
additional opportunity costs a household may incur from labor choices made in response 
to raising children.  
While both the intended or accidental transfers to children in the form of bequests 
and whether households plan on receiving these bequest may be debatable, inter-vivos 
transfers (transfers from parents to children while the parents are still living) must be 
intended and the plans for such transfers are much more likely to be considered by the 
recipients when making decisions.  These transfers often occur as gifts, paying for 
college, or as help with a down payment on a house.    Using data from the 1983-1986 
Survey of Consumer Finances, Gale and Scholz (1994) find that intended inter-vivos 
transfers can make up approximately 20% of a household’s wealth.  However, again, 
these are often concentrated among the very wealthy.  Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate 
a model where young households receive transfers from parents (the process is random 
but allowed to depend on several know factors) and find that inter-vivos wealth transfers 
received by young households are significant.  To the extent that such transfers do 
account for wealth accumulation, they should be considered when modeling life-cycle 
behavior, both for the parents and the children.  Furthermore, these decisions are certainly 
related to the choice of having children and represent a very complicated challenge to 
model. 
Transfers from parents to children often take the form of investments in human 
capital.  In particular, it is very common in the U.S. for parents to help pay for the post-
secondary education of their children.  These educational subsidies do not have some of 
the divisive issues involved with the other wealth transfers discussed above.  Helping pay 
for college, like other inter-vivos transfers, is certainly intended by parents and not 
accidental.  Furthermore, since they are used toward paying the expenses of receiving an 
education, they are not so much direct additions to the asset wealth of children as they are 
an education subsidy and determinant in the future income path of children. 
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One reason for the prevalence of these transfers is the rising out-of-pocket 
expense of college education in the U.S.  Berkner et al. (2002), using data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), report that for that the average tuition 
for private, not-for-profit, 4-year schools was $15,000 for the 1999-2000 academic year.  
This was lower at other schools:  $8,900 for private, for-profit institutions, $4,300 for 
public 4-year institutions and $1,600 for public 2-year institutions.  The full price 
including non-tuition expenses is much higher.  The same study finds that for a full time 
student, the average full price was $23,600 for private, not-for-profit, 4-year schools, 
$18,400 for private, for-profit schools, $12,600 for public, 4-year schools and $9,100 for 
public 2-year schools.  These are obviously significant and large expenses. 
Of course, these costs are not necessarily the out-of-pocket expense incurred by 
students because many receive some assistance from grants, loans, and/or other forms of 
financial aid.  Berkner et al. (2002) find that for the 1999-2000 academic year, 27% of 
students received some for of aid but not loans, 22% received subsidized loans and other 
aid,  and 7% received subsidized loans only.  That still leaves 45% with no aid at all.  The 
percent will no aid falls to 28% when considering only full-time students, but that is still 
a significant portion without aid.  More importantly, the aid sources do not come close to 
covering the full cost of education for most students.  Berkner et al. (2002) calculate that 
the average total aid for full time students receiving some form of aid at private, not-for-
profit 4-year institutions in 1999-2000 was $11,600, and was $7,200 for students at 
private, for profit schools, $6,200 for public 4-year schools and $2,300 for public 2-year 
schools.  These findings are consistent with McPherson and Shapiro (1991) who a decade 
earlier found that 38% of students in public schools and 68% of those in private schools 
received some form of aid but that on average it only covered 75% of public school 
expenses and 50% of private school expenses. 
The bottom line is that students still must cover large out-of-pocket expenses for 
post-secondary education.  Some of the money needed certainly comes from students’ 
own earnings and savings.  In addition, many students receive financial support from 
their parents, and these amounts can be large.  Using data from the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), Lee (2001) finds that for the 1995-1996 
academic year, 91.9% of undergraduate students attending schools with tuition and fees 
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greater than $12,000 received some direct financial contribution from their parents.  
This percentage was still high for students at schools with tuition and fees less than 
$12,000:  79.6% for public research institutions and 70.8% for other institutions.  Using 
data gathered by the NCES, Choy and Henke (1992) found that in 1989, 67% of parents 
contributed to their children’s college education and the average annual amount was 
$3,900 ($5,240 in 1999 dollars, adjusted using the CPI).  While the percentage of parents 
contributing and the amounts they contribute have surely been increasing as college costs 
have risen, these contributions have long been a significant source of funds for students.  
Leslie (1984), using data from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP), 
found that for the 1979-1980 academic year 47.6% of students received support from 
their parents and the amount averaged $1,426 ($3,272 in 1999 dollars). 
The out-of-pocket expenses that students must pay for a college education has 
also motivated a wide variety of policies to help students pay afford a college degree.  
Most government support in the form of the grants and loans previously discussed is 
directly targeted at the student attending school.  Several studies have tried to measure 
the extent these programs help increase college attendance.  For example, many argue 
that an education subsidy should have a significant impact, especially if students tend to 
face borrowing constraints.  Using data from the introduction of the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship program as a quasi-experiment, Dynarski (2000; 2002) finds the availability 
of an additional $1,000 subsidy increases attendance by 4%.  She also claims that this is 
consistent with previous findings.  Ichimura and Taber (2002) estimate a 4.5% increase in 
attendance from the availability of a $1,000 subsidy.  They estimate this using a reduced 
form estimation derived from the model used by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and use the 
same data as the Keane and Wolpin study.  As discussed by Keane (2002),  Keane and 
Wolpin actually estimate that a $100 tuition increase (a negative subsidy) would lower 
enrollment rates of 18-24-year-olds by 1.2%.  Interestingly, Keane and Wolpin, while 
finding that borrowing constraints are indeed tight for students (they can not even support 
one year from borrowing alone), they do not find that allowing for easier loan access will 
increase attendance.  Instead, they find that the major impact of reducing the borrowing 
constraint is in a reduction of working by students.  Perhaps more importantly, they do 
find that parental transfers contingent on college attendance significantly increase the 
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educational attainment of children, which is consistent with the findings that subsidies 
increase attendance. 
In recent years, several policies have been created to help parents pay for the 
college education of their children.  That is, policies where the goal is to increase the 
amounts parents contribute toward their children’s education.  The Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 1997 created several such policies.  The first two are tax breaks.  The Hope 
Scholarship Credit is a tax credit for 100% of the first $1,000 of qualified tuition 
expenses and 50% of the next $1,000 of qualified tuition expenses.  This is only available 
in the first two years of post-secondary education and is phased out at higher incomes 
($40,000-$50,000 for individual taxpayers, twice that for married households).  The 
credit can be claimed for expenses for yourself or a dependant.  Hence, parents can claim 
it for college expenses paid for their dependant children.  The Lifetime Learning Credit is 
similar except that it is available for any year of education (not just the first two years) 
but is for 20% of up to $5,000 in expenses (this will increase to $10,000 in 2003).  Also, 
the Hope Scholarship Credit can be claimed for each child supported separately but the 
Lifetime Learning credit is a per family credit.  The act also set up an educational savings 
account, originally often referred to as an educational IRA.  This is really just a custodial 
account for children under 18 for which the earnings and distributions are tax-free as long 
as they are used for qualified education expenses.  However, originally no more than 
$500 may was allowed be put into the account per-year and even this is phased out at 
higher income levels.  This amount increased to $2,000 in 2002 and the program was 
renamed the Coverdell Education Savings Account.  An additional type of savings plan 
that was created are 529 plans (also created in 1997, they are named for the IRS tax code 
that allows for favorable tax treatment to qualified state tuition programs) which are 
actually run by states.  Since they are administered by states, the details can vary some 
from state to state but in general there are two types of 529 plans.  The first type is a 
prepaid tuition plan.  In these plans, money is contributed in a child’s name and locks in 
an associated percentage of college expenses at current tuition rates at one of the state’s 
public universities.  If you choose to use the money somewhere other than one of the 
state’s public schools, you will get the amount you contributed to the account, but often 
without any earnings.  As such, these plans are really just hedging against rapid rises in 
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college tuition.  The other type of 529 plan is a college savings plan.  These accounts 
accept contributions that can grow tax-free until distribution.  Starting in 2002, withdraws 
were also allowed to be tax-free.  Specific limits vary by states, but at the federal level all 
contributions are treated under the gift tax laws, which are not triggered until gifts exceed 
$10,000.  Starting in 2002, families were also allowed to switch between different types 
of 529 plans.  More recently, President Bush’s budget proposal for 2003 includes the 
creation new education savings accounts that would replace the Coverdell accounts and 
allow for $7,500 in contributions per year.  
The model and work presented here builds upon the above strains of literature in 
several important ways.  First, the choice to have children, the number of children to have 
and the timing of when to have children are all made as endogenous decisions within the 
life-cycle framework.  Furthermore, families are allowed to choose to make transfers to 
their children in the form of educational subsidies.  Together, this allows for a rich 
relationship between the number of children to have, how much to provide these children 
with a form of inter-vivos transfers, and savings and consumption within the life-cycle.  
The educational subsidies in the model will also provide a way to conduct policy 
simulations to look at predicted impacts of programs aimed at getting parents to 
contribute more toward their children’s education. 
  
3. The Model  
3.1 The General Model 
This section develops a general model to look at household consumption and savings 
decisions along with choices on how many children to have and how much to spend on 
children’s college education.  A key feature of the model, unlike previous models looking 
at household savings interacted with the number of children in the household, is that the 
number of children in a household is an endogenous choice.  The model is a based on a 
household dynamic programming problem.  Households have a lifespan of T periods and 
face earnings uncertainty throughout their life.  In each period households choose how 
much to consume and how much to save.  In addition, younger households must also 
decide how many children to have, and households with college-age children must decide 
how much money to contribute to their children’s education. 
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 To make these decisions, households maximize their expected discounted 
utility.  Each household’s contemporaneous utility for a period depends on both the level 
of consumption and the number of children in the family.  Furthermore, households 
receive additional utility as their children become more educated.  A household’s utility 
for any given period, t, is then in general given by 
 
  U ),,,,...,,,,( 21 etntctEttttt eeenc εεε      (1) 
 
where U(.) is the utility function, ct is consumption at time t, nt is the total number of 
children at time t, ejt is the number of children with education level j at time t where j is 
one of E education levels (j=1,…,E), and εct is a consumption taste shock at time t, εnt is a 
taste shock to the number of children at time t, and εet is a taste shock to the education 
levels at time t.  
 In each period, households choose a level of consumption and savings.  
Households can also have children in periods 1 through T*, and so must also choose how 
many additional children to have in each of those periods.  As stated previously, children 
may add to a household’s utility both directly and through the amount of education they 
attain.  There are also, however, costs to having children.  While children live at home, 
the household incurs a cost of Ψ per child.  All children are assumed to live at home for 
M periods, at which time they move out. 
When a child moves out at age M+1, the household has the option to contribute 
money toward his or her college education.  At this time, the household chooses a one-
time offer, ot, of a per-year amount to contribute toward the child’s college education.  
Given this offer, the child then attains a certain an education level.  From the household’s 
view, a child’s education level is a realization of a stochastic process that depends on the 
amount of support offered by the household, along with other possible observably 
demographic variables.  For the household, letting djt be the education level child j 
receives in period t, 
 
( )jtjtjt wdDd |~              (2) 
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so that djt is a realization of the conditional distribution D(djt|wjt) where wjt is a vector 
including the amount offered by the household to child j, along with other possible 
factors including a family type effect.  The amount the household actually pays toward a 
child’s college education is then a product of the per-year offer made and the number of 
years of schooling the child attends. 
 Throughout their lives, households face an uncertain income stream.  In any given 
period t, a household earns a specific amount of income, It.  This amount of income is a 
realization of a random process that may depend on certain household characteristic such 
as level of education.  The process differs before and after retirement and all households 
are assumed to retire at age T**.  As such, It is a realization,  
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where Zt is a vector of household characteristics and H(.|.) and Hret(.|.) are the appropriate 
distributions of income before and after retirement. 
 The households’ problem, then, is to solve 
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where δ is the discount rate.  The maximization is made subject to 
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where kt is the level of household assets at time t, r is the real interest rate, nht is the 
number of children living at home at time t, ant is the amount the household pays toward 
child n’s college expenses at time t and the remaining variables are defined as mentioned 
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previously.  The expectation is over the taste shocks to consumption, children, their 
educational attainment and the realizations of future income and children’s educational 
attainment.  To implement this model, then, what remains is to detail specifications for 
the utility function, the random taste shocks, the income and children’s educational 
attainment processes, and to set values for the number of periods, T, the retirement age 
T**, the age through which households may have children, T*, the number of periods 
children live at home, M, and the different levels of education that children may attain.  
These details, along with a method to both solve the model and to estimate the model 
parameters are laid out in the next sections. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
I now turn to a full specification of the general model.  The specification will allow the 
model to be solved and subsequently estimated using the NLS data described in section 
four.  In particular, specifications are needed for the utility function, the random taste 
shocks, the income and children’s educational attainment processes, the parental offer 
process, and to set values for the number of periods, T, the retirement age T**, the age 
through which households may have children, T*, the number of periods children live at 
home, M, and the different levels of education that children may attain.   
   A period in the model is assumed to last 6 years.  Since assets evolve slowly 
over time the assumption of such a long period should not significantly impact the 
results2.  The maximum age, T, is set to 12 giving households an adult lifespan of 72 
years (corresponding to ages 18 to 90).  Households are assumed to retire at age 66, so 
T** is set to 9. 
Households may choose to have children during any of the first three periods, 
after which they no longer have children, so T* is set to 3.  This implies that all 
households have all their children by an age of 36. In addition, households are restricted 
to having no more than 4 children in any one period, and no more than 5 children in total.  
These restrictions impact only a small portion of the data and significantly ease the 
2 As will be seen later in the paper, the 6-year period also closely corresponds with the frequency that asset 
information is collected in the data and the general biennial data collection for the NLS.  Furthermore, the 
longer periods will greatly reduce the computational complexity of the model solution. 
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computational burden of solving the model.  Within the NLS data (the data are 
described in detail in a later section), only 7.18% of households have children when older 
than 36, so this is not too stringent a limitation.  Furthermore, only 1.94% had more than 
4 children in any single six-year period and only 4.27% had more than 5 children.  In all, 
only 10.78% of the NLS sample violates one or more of these three restrictions (i.e. had 
more than 4 children in a given 6-year period, had more than 5 children in total and/or 
had children after the age of 36). 
Children are assumed to move out after 3 periods at home, so M is set to 3.  This 
corresponds to children moving out at age 18.  Actually, this assumption just means that 
the household incurs a cost of raising a child for only 3 periods.  In the period a child 
moves out (the 4th period of a child’s life), the household has the option to help pay for 
that child’s college education.  It is assumed that households only make these 
contributions in the period that their children move out.  This assumption again 
significantly eases the computability of the solution and does not impact very many 
households.  In fact, in the NLS data only 14.45% of children attending school received 
support after age 24, and for most of these that support came within the next two years. 
When making an offer of financial support for college education, households are 
restricted to make the same offer to all children moving out in a given period.  This 
assumption allows for the identification of the impact offers make on how much 
schooling children receive.  This is necessary because what are reported in the data are 
the amounts parents actually contributed toward their children’s education.  Obviously, 
then, there is no data on this for children who did not go to college and yet it is probable 
that some these children would have received some support from their parents.  The 
assumption here is that those children receive the same offer of support as their siblings 
attending school within the same period.  The data suggest that this is not overly 
restrictive.  Again when looking at the NLS data, within a period, most families do not 
greatly vary the amount they contribute toward their different children.  In fact, 50.5% 
made contributions that differed by less than $1,000 and almost 20% of contributions 
differed by less than $50. 
The restriction that children born within the same period receive the same offer, 
while providing identification for the impact of the offer, does imply that if offers 
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positively impact the educational attainment of children, then one should observe that 
on average, when comparing families with the same number of children, the families with 
more children in college will be making larger contributions toward their children’s 
education.  It is not obvious that this should be the case because, for example, a family 
with two children and both of them in college at the same time may have less money 
available to support either individually than if just one was attending college.  The data, 
though, do support the assumption and its implication.  Looking at the NLS data, for 
families with two children born within six years of each other, the average per-child, per-
year contribution in 1999 dollars is $5,721 for those with both children attending college, 
and only $3,666 for those with just one child in college. 
The stochastic process that determines the level of education a child receives, that 
is dtj~D(dtj|wtj), is assumed to be an ordered probit.  The vector of factors, wtj, includes a 
quadratic in the family contribution offer and the level of the parents’ education.  It is 
assumed that the outcome is one of three discrete outcomes dtj∈{low, medium, high}.  
These low, medium and high outcomes correspond to high school or less, some post-
secondary education or a 2-year degree, and a bachelor’s or higher degree.3 
 The household contemporaneous utility function for any period is assumed to take 
the form 
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which combines a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function for 
consumption with additively separate quadratic utility in the number of children, the 
number of children with some college education and the number of children with a 
bachelor’s or higher degree.  The utility parameters for children and education are 
allowed some heterogeneity with respect to different education levels, and the child 
parameters are allowed to further vary in the first three periods.   
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The shocks for each period are drawn as follows.  In every period, εct, is drawn from an 
iid lognormal distribution with log mean zero and εnt and εqt are drawn from zero mean iid 
normal distributions, so that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2qt2nt2 ,0~  ,,0 ~  ,,0~ln qncct NNN σεσεσε .                            (7) 
 
 Household income is assumed to be determined by, 
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where the characteristic vector Zt contains dummies for the levels of education and 
marital status interacted with a quadratic in age.  The exponential specification for 
earnings leads to a standard wage equation where ln(wt) = Ztβ + εIt for pre-retirement 
income.  Post-retirement income is then a certain percentage, b, of the average expected 
pre-retirement income.  The pre-retirement and post-retirement income shocks are 
assumed to be distributed by zero mean iid normal distributions so  
 
εIt ~ N(0 ,σI2) and εrt ~ N(0 ,σr2).                (9) 
 
While earnings certainly may be argued to show some short-term persistence, the iid 
assumption is not unreasonable for the longer six-year periods of this model. 
Because the impact of marital transitions is not a focus of this paper, marital 
status is assumed to be constant over the agent’s life.  Without this assumption, changes 
from single to married and vice versa will be accompanied by shocks to not only income 
but to assets as well.  In addition, the decisions to marry and divorce and the separate 
contributions toward their children’s education from divorced couples would also need to 
be modeled.  Assuming a constant marital status allows for a simpler model that focuses 
on the household savings and educational transfer decisions.  This clearly will limit the 
sample this model is applied to, which will be outlined in more detail later.  The level of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 In addition, limiting the number of outcomes to three will greatly ease the computation burden of solving 
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education of the household for earnings consideration is also a constant in this model.  
As such, both marital status and education are assumed to be a constant family type.    
Finally, households are also assumed to face the following constraints: 
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where n4t is the number of children of age 4 in period t and ot is the per-year, per-child 
offer.  The first two conditions imply that households have positive consumption and that 
they cannot take out uncollateralized loans.  The third condition restricts households to 
have no more than four additional children in a period and that the number of children 
cannot decrease.  The fourth restriction is the maximum family size of five children.  
Lastly, the offer is restricted so that it must be non-negative and, because the offer is 
binding, a household is not allowed to offer more than can be covered without taking out 
an uncollateralized loan. 
 The timing of the model is outlined in figures 1-3.  At the beginning of each 
period the household receives a realization of εct, εnt, εqt, and εIt or εrt. After the 
realization of these shocks, the household then receives their income and pays out 
expenses for children living at home.  The household then makes decisions for the period.  
In the first three periods, the choices of an amount to save and the number of children to 
have in that period are made simultaneously.  In periods 4-6, if the agent has children 
who are of college age, the educational support offer and the savings decisions are made 
sequentially.  Parents first choose a per-child, per-year amount to offer their children in 
educational support.  Parents then realize the outcomes of their children’s education 
choices and make the appropriate payments.  Finally, the household chooses a level of 
savings and consumption. 
 
3.3  Solving the Model 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the model. 
 19
The household optimization problem can be rewritten recursively.  Let s∈S where S is 
the state space and s is a specific point within the state space. In every period the 
household chooses some level of consumption and savings, given their state variables.  
At the same time, if the household is of the appropriate age, they also choose the number 
of additional children to add to the family.   I will refer to these decisions as the primary 
problem.  In periods 4, 5 and 6, the household may also solve another problem, the offer 
to children.  Sequentially, a household solves the offer problem at the beginning of the 
applicable period and then solves the primary problem for that period after observing the 
education outcomes of their children.  In all other periods, the household just solves the 
primary problem.  Let Ot(s) be the value of entering the offer problem at age t with state s 
and let Vt(s) be the value of entering the primary problem at age t with state s. Ot(s) is the 
solution to 
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subject to (5)-(16), where the expectation is taken with respect to the educational 
outcome of the children.  Vt(s) can now be written as the solution to 
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subject to (5)-(16) where a “ ′ ” on a variable indicates the value in the next period.  The 
expectations here are taken with respect to εc, εn, εq and εI or εr. It is assumed that VT+1(s) 
= 0.  In most periods, then, the household just goes from solving the primary problem in 
one period to solving it again in the next period.  After periods 3, 4, and 5, however, the 
household first solves the offer problem and then proceeds to solve the primary problem 
for that period. 
 The state space for the for a household is QQNNNKS ×××××=  where k is 
the level of assets, k∈K R⊂ + , nt is the number of children born in period, 
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nt∈N={0,1,…,4}and qjt is the number of children of education level j in period t, 
qjt∈Q={0,1,…,5}.  Since the household education level and marital status do not change, 
they can be suppressed from the state space and the model solved separately for type.  
Age is a state variable, but the period subscripts capture that so it is not listed in the 
vector s.   
 In making their decisions, households actually use the level of disposable cash-
on-hand, and not the asset level directly.  Let xt be the amount of disposable cash-on-
hand.  At the beginning of every period, 
 
 xt = (1+rk)kt-1 + It – nhtψ.                             (19) 
 
Within the periods that the offer and savings problems are both solved, xt updates by 
subtracting the amount that was spent on college. 
The model can be solved as a finite horizon dynamic programming problem.  
Given a set of parameter values, the direct way to solve a finite-horizon problem is to 
solve the problem for every possible combination of state points backwards from the final 
period to the initial period.  However, this method is not a practical option when the 
number of state points becomes too many or when there are continuous variables in the 
state space.  The reason is that there is a "curse of dimensionality" due to the fact that the 
number of combinations of state points grows too large or even infinite so that computing 
a solution for each one is not possible.  This is compounded by the fact that multiple 
integration over the random shocks is necessary at each step to get the expected value 
functions (EMAX), (i.e. the expectations in (17) and (18).) 
The specification assumptions used here that limiting the number of children and 
the number of periods that families can have children help limit the number of 
combinations of children born at different periods and their educational attainment in the 
state space to a manageable number.  As outlined previously, these restrictions on the 
choice set only impact a small portion of the data, and they clearly ease the computation 
of a model solution.  However, since assets are a continuous variable, the solution still 
cannot be calculated for every state variable combination.  Even if assets were to be 
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discretized in a reasonable way, the resulting state space would still be huge.  As such, 
the model here clearly still suffers from a curse of dimensionality. 
 One method of overcoming this is to utilize an estimate for the integration 
involved in the expectations and to solve the model for a subset of the possible state 
points and interpolate for the remaining values of the EMAX.  Keane and Wolpin (1994) 
propose using Monte Carlo integration to evaluate the expectations in the EMAX and 
interpolating over a subset of state points for which the model is solved using least 
squares.  They offer extensive Monte Carlo simulations showing the effectiveness of this 
method.  The solution technique used here follows the Keane-Wolpin methodology.  The 
model will be solved for every possible combination of the discrete state variables (the 
number of children in each period and their education levels) but for each of these 
combinations I will only directly solve for a subset of asset values.  The expectations are 
approximated using Monte Carlo integration and the EMAX functions will be 
interpolated at the remaining asset levels using least squares.  For (18) the interpolation is 
the regression of directly solved EMAX values on the contemporary utility evaluated at 
the means of the stochastic components and for (17) the optimal offers are regressed on 
assets (Keane and Wolpin, 1994). 
 
3.4  Estimation 
The model is estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood4.  The solution to the 
dynamic programming problem provides the input into estimating the likelihood.  For 
each individual, this problem is deterministic, but from the economists view it is 
probabilistic because we do not observe the contemporaneous shocks.  As such, a 
likelihood function can be constructed and estimated based on the outcomes predicted by 
the model solution at different parameter values. 
 Several previous studies have utilized a similar estimation procedure for discrete 
choice models (Stern 1994; Keane and Wolpin 1997; 2001).  Keane and Wolpin (2001) 
develop an expanded approach for a model that maintains a discrete choice set but allows 
for additional continuous and unobserved outcome variables, such as income.  They 
4 For a good summary of simulation based estimation techniques, see Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).  
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accomplish this with an innovative use of assuming there is measurement error for the 
unobserved variables.  With discrete choice models the likelihood is composed of the 
probabilities of the different choices occurring.  Simulated probability estimators utilizing 
simulated samples generated from the model are used to estimate these probabilities and 
therefore generate the likelihood which is maximized (for examples of such simulators 
see McFadden 1989; Geweke, Keane et al. 1994; Stern 1994; Keane and Wolpin 1997).  
Since the model in this paper contains continuous choices, the exact same procedure 
cannot be followed.  However, the same concept applies, but instead of probability 
simulators I use nonparametric a density estimator is used with simulated samples to 
construct the elements of the likelihood. 
 Consider a single household, i, from the data.  A sequence of state points for this 
household (and hence the decisions they made) is observed.  Since the decisions made in 
the model depend only on the current state variable and exogenous, independently 
distributed shocks, household i’s contribution to the likelihood, Li can be rewritten as a 
sequence of conditional densities: 
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where f(.) is the pdf of st+1 conditional on st. The sample likelihood is then calculated as 
the product of these individual likelihoods. 
 A problem remains in calculating the likelihood because the functional fomr of 
f(.) is unknown.  However, given a set of the parameters, the model can be solved and 
therefore a sample of values for st+1 given a value of st can be simulated.  From this 
sample, then, a density estimator can be calculated and used to estimate the value of 
f(st+1|st).  Several smooth density estimators have been proposed and used for discrete 
choice models in a setting such as this (e.g. McFadden 1989; Geweke, Keane et al. 1994; 
Stern 1994; Keane and Wolpin 1997).  These methods consist of using some sort of 
smoothed probability estimator of the probabilities of the different finite (discrete) 
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outcomes occurring5.  However, the model here involves a continuous choice in assets.  
One possible way to deal with this is to discretize assets.  Yet, the model and solution 
methods have been constructed to preserve a continuous choice in assets.  An alternative, 
then, is to use a continuous density estimator.  This is the approach that I take in 
estimating the model. 
  There is a wide literature on density estimation and techniques for continuous 
and mixed variable distributions (for a summary see Silverman 1986).  Because of the 
maximization problem involved, a smooth density estimator is important here, and I will 
use a smooth kernel density estimator.  In using a continuous variable, though, the 
density is no longer the probabililty of one outcome resulting from a finite number of 
choices.  Instead, the continuous or mixed density of the next period state space must be 
estimated.  Furthermore, the dimension of the state space becomes important.  
Unfortunately, traditional kernel estimators are notoriously innacuarate and difficult (if 
not impossible) to implement when used in higher dimension space.  Since the state space 
here is certainly multidimensional, this must be addressed. 
 Given the specific model here, it turns out that no more than two observed state 
space values change between any two observed periods in which the estimated density 
must be calculated.  The remaining values are fixed.  As such, it is never necessary to 
estimate a joint density for more than two variables.  For example, after period six, the 
number of children and their education levels are all fixed so just assets change.  As such, 
the conditional density for these periods is just the one-dimensional conditional density of 
next period assets given current assets.  In the education periods, 4-6, the number of 
children is fixed, but there is an offer decision, and education levels and assets are 
changing.  However, this process is sequential in the model:  first an offer is made, then 
educational outcomes are realized conditional on this offer, and then savings decisions 
are made.  As such, there are really three independent conditional densities for these 
periods, one of offer given the initial state, the next of educational outcomes given the 
5 Several of the previous estimates of discrete choice models referenced above have constructed their 
density estimates based on the fact that a certain set of observed outcomes (state space values) is the result 
of the value function evaluated at those outcomes being the greatest among the finite (dicrete) options 
available.  As such, the probabilities can be calculated from simulating the probability the value function is 
greatest for these choices. 
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offer and the initial state, and finally of savings given the initial state and educational 
outcomes.  So again, only a one-dimensional density estimator is needed for the offer and 
asset updates, and a two-dimensional estimator for the educational outcomes for changes 
in the number of children with some college or a four-year degree.  In the first three 
periods, the education levels are constant, as are the number of children born in any 
period except the current one.  So, only the number of children in the current period and 
savings are being decided upon.  As such, again only a bivariate density estimator is 
needed for these periods. 
 The specific density estimators that I use are as follows.  In general, a univariate 
kernel density estimate is calculated from 
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where s is the data point at which the density is to be calculated, n is the number of data 
points in the data sample, Si is the ith observation in the data sample and h is a smoothing 
parameter.  The function K(.) is the kernel function and the resulting  is the estimate for 
the true density, f.  When a univariate continuous density estimator is needed, in periods 
seven and beyond (for assets) and in the offer portion of periods four through six (for the 
offer value), I use a standard Gaussian Kernel.  As such the kernel function is 
fˆ
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and for the smoothing parameter I use Silverman’s (1986) plug in value for an optimal 
window width for the Gaussian kernel 
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where σˆ is the standard deviation of the variable in the sample data.  This choice of a 
value for the smoothing parameter (or slight variants) is also proposed and discussed in 
Härdle (1991) and Scott (1992).  In a comparative simulation study of kernel methods, 
Bowman (1985) finds that such a plug-in parameter selection, while simple, performed 
very well even when compared to more advanced smoothing parameter selection 
methods. 
 For the bivariate densities I use a bivariate product kernel (Scott 1992) which in 
general takes the form 
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When the bivariate estimates are needed, however, they are either for either two discrete 
variables (educational outcomes when appropriate in periods 4-6) or mixed with a 
continuous variable (assets) and a discrete variable (new children) in periods 1-3.  For the 
continuous portion I again use a standard Gaussian kernel as described in (18)-(19).  For 
the discrete values, a variety of smooth kernel estimators could be used.  Notice, though, 
that the variables here (number of children and number of children with certain 
educational outcomes) are not just categorical, but are ordered and the values matter.  For 
example, having three children is closer to the choice of having two children than say 
having five children.  To take advantage of this, I utilize a variant of the Habbema kernel 
which was found to be highly effective by Titterington and Bowman (1985) with 
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where λ is a smoothness parameter.  In this kernel the traditional smoothness weight, h, is 
set to  
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where J is the number of discrete distances possible between s and other data points in 
the sample and acts just as an appropriate weight.  The amount of smoothing is then 
controlled by λ, which is set to 0.36. 
 So the estimation procedure works as follows.  First, an initial guess of the 
parameters is made.  The model is solved for these parameters.  The value of the 
likelihood function is constructed using the simulated density estimation just described.  
The likelihood is checked to see if it is maximized, if it is not, the guess is updated and 
the procedure repeats itself.  The parameters are updated for the maximization routing 
using a version of a simplex algorithm originally proposed by Nelder and Mead (1965). 
and discussed in Acton (1990). 
 
 
4. The Data 
The data are taken from the young women cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS).  The young women cohort of the NLS consists of 5,159 women who were 14-24 
years old in 1968. Surveys were administered every year from 1968 through 1973 and 
then basically every other year since then. The original cohort sample is based on a core 
random sample and an over-sample of blacks. While the NLS collects data on a wide 
variety of topics, the relevant information used in this analysis is data on assets, income, 
children, education, marital status, children’s education and spending on children’s 
education.   The data used here are from 1968-1999.  
 
4.1 Sample and variable definitions. 
Periods in the model are specified to be six years long.  When matching this with the 
data, the first period is matched to ages 18-23 in a household’s life, the second ages 24-29 
and so on.  The age of the household is measured as the age of the women followed in the 
NLS data.   
6 Setting λ=0 results in a histogram and setting λ=1 results in an equal density estimate of 1/J for all values.  
0.3 is utilized by Titterington and Bowman (1985) and as with their studies, I find that changing this within 
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 Comprehensive questions on assets were asked in 1968, 1971-1973, 1978, 
1983, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999.  Asset information obtained includes 
information about housing, mortgages, savings, stocks, bonds, vehicles, business, farm or 
real estate assets and outstanding debts.  For analysis with the model above, assets are 
measured as total net household assets, excluding vehicles.  If more than one observation 
of assets is available within the appropriate age range for a period for a household (which 
is the case when assets information is collected regularly), the earlier dated value is used 
because the model treats the assets of a period as the assets available to the household 
when entering that period. 
 Income information is collected with every survey, but the level of detail varies 
some between years.  Income questions cover wages of the respondent and spouse, 
business or farm income, rental income, unemployment compensation, disability income, 
welfare, income of other family members and other income.  In some years, separate 
questions on interest and dividend income, food stamps, alimony and child support, 
social security and pension income and assistance from relatives were also asked.  
Income in the model is measured as the total income of a woman and her spouse.  To fit 
with the six-year periods, the income amount is calculated as six times the average of the 
annual income observations within the appropriate age range. 
 Educational information about the respondents is collected in every survey.  
Information on the highest grade attended is collected and updated every survey.  In 
addition, in 1983 questions were asked on whether the respondent had earned a high 
school diploma or GED and if so when.  This information was then updated in all 
subsequent surveys for those respondents who attended school since the last interview. 
Finally, information on the highest degree received was collected in the initial year and 
updated in every subsequent interview for those who had received a degree since the last 
interview.  Information on the level of education of spouses is also collected.  The level 
of education enters the model in two ways.  First, it is a factor in the wage equation.  
Second, it is a factor in the level of education attained by children in the household.  
Also, the model assumes that the level of education is constant for a household’s lifetime.   
 
a reasonable range does not qualitatively impact the estimates.  For more discussion on kernel methods for 
discrete distributions refer to Aitken (1983). 
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The household education level is therefore measured as the highest level of education 
attained by either parent in a household.  The measured education level of a household is 
then grouped into one of two categories, those with a college degree, and those without.  
So, there are in essence two education “types” of households.  The limit to two education 
categories is because the sample sizes within education groups become rather small when 
more categories are used, and because the estimation technique takes multiplicatively 
longer for each additional education level. 
 Marital status is asked in every interview and in most surveys the marital history 
since the last interview is updated.  As with the level of education, marital status is 
assumed to be constant in the model.  I classify a household as married in the model if the 
woman is married before age 36 and in no subsequent interview after getting married are 
they no longer married.  In similar fashion, someone never married is considered single.  
However, in this cohort, the number of women who were never married and also satisfy 
the other data assumptions and restrictions is extremely small.  Because of this, I will 
only consider stable, married households.  As such, the results in actuality can only be 
claimed to be attributed to such stable and married households. 
 In every interview, detailed information is collected for each of the respondent’s 
children living in the household.  This information includes among other things, the 
child’s age.  In addition, in 1978 information on the age of up to eight children born by 
1978 was collected.  Similar information followed in 1983 for children born between 
1978 and 1983.  In 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1999 the information was collected 
for children born since the last interview.  Furthermore, in 1999 a full child roster was 
collected which includes children’s birth-dates, and level of education.  From this 
information, children can be grouped into being born in the first, second or third period of 
the model and the appropriate educational attainment category can also be assigned for 
each child.  As was explained in detailing the model specification, the model assumes 
households can only have children in the first three six-year periods, and that they have 
no more than five children, and no more than four within a given period.  As was 
mentioned when discussing these restrictions in the specification, only 10.78% of the 
NLS sample violates one or more of these three restrictions and will not be used.  This 
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restriction, while perhaps not a large loss of data, should be kept in mind when 
considering the types of households for which the results are estimated. 
 Beginning in 1991 and subsequently in 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999, the survey 
includes questions about the college enrollment of children and the amount of financial 
support the parent’s provided toward college for each child within the past twelve 
months.  The offer in the model is assumed to be the same for all children born in the 
same period, as was described earlier along with the reasons for this assumption and 
appropriateness of the assumption.  The offer is measured as the average annual 
contribution parents made toward post-secondary education for children born in the 
appropriate period.  Unfortunately, the only data collected on parent’s contributions is the 
biennial question about how much was contributed within the last 12 months.  There is 
not data on the total amount spent on a child’s post-secondary education.  Some measure 
of this is needed to update the household assets level for the total amount parents spend to 
assist their children’s education.  This amount will be computed as 4 times the offer for 
those children within the four-year college degree education category, and 2 times the 
offer for those children within the some college education category.  This is not an 
amount matched to any particular figure in the data, but is used to update the household’s 
evolving assets. 
 As mentioned previously, the original NLS young women cohort sample began 
with 5,159 women of ages 14-24 years old when the initial data collection began in 1968.  
For analysis with the model in this paper, this set is restricted to those women who 
remained in the data set through 1999 and reported information on all the necessary and 
relevant variables.  One impact of this is that it somewhat overly excludes the older 
women in the sample.  This is because data on contributions toward their children’s 
education was only gathered starting in 1991.  Therefore, some of these women had 
children already educated before any information on their contributions was collected.  
However, there is no reason to suspect that these women are significantly different from 
the younger women in the cohort so this should not be a problem.  The sample is further 
limited to those women who meet the stable marriage criteria outlined above.  Lastly, 
given the size of the sample and the likely measurement error that accounts for extremely 
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high and low reported assets levels, outlier observations were deleted.7  This leaves a 
sample of 556 households with 3,139 household-period observations. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the sample breakdown between of the average number of children for 
different levels of household education.  Less educated households have more children, 
averaging 2.395 per household versus 2.208 for households with a college degree.  Not 
surprisingly, the timing of when to have children is also very different.  College educated 
households have very few children, only 0.476 on average, during ages 18 through 23.  
Conversely, this is when households without a college degree have the most children, 
averaging 1.225 children per household born during ages 18 through 23.   At older age 
ranges, however, it is the college-educated households who have more children.  During 
ages 30-35, college educated households have an average of 0.759 children, while those 
without a college degree have only 0.344. 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the asset accumulation of households at 
different ages and by differing levels of education.  Since the oldest in the cohort are just 
now reaching their mid-to-late fifties, the accumulation pattern is just increasing through 
the years.  In fact, the accumulation is very rapid from an average of just over $4,000 in 
1999 dollars at ages 18-23 to an average of $218,947 for when reaching ages 48-53.  The 
amount of assets is greater for those with a college degree and the accumulation even 
more rapid.  Still, for those with no more than a high school degree, average assets grow 
from $4,431 when 18-23 to over $170,000 by the time they reach ages 54-59.  As usual, 
the asset distribution is largely skewed toward high values as is shown by the much lower 
median asset values.  For the entire sample, the median asset level grows from a mere 
956 when aged 18-23 to $145,000 when reaching ages 54-59. 
 The percent of households with negative asset values is also listed in Table 2.  
Ten percent of the sample lists negative asset levels at ages 18-23 but this progressively 
declines to only 3.6 percent when aged 42-47 and 1.89 percent by ages 48-53.  The 
percentage declines less steadily through the years for households without a college 
7 The upper and lower truncation points differed for each period.  In total, 21 observations from below and 
28 from above were cut. 
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degree, but still is never greater than just over ten percent.  Perhaps more significantly, 
the average value of assets for those with a negative asset level is never very far from 
zero, ranging from just less than $-1,000 to just under $-3,000.  So while some 
percentage of households do have negative net assets, this percentage becomes more 
negligible as households age, and the negative amount does not tend to fall much below 
zero.  This is consistent with previous research on the liquidity constraints on households 
(see for example Keane and Wolpin 2001) and is not too far from the constraint against 
non-collateralized loans in the model estimated here, particularly after period one. 
 Figure 4 breaks down household asset accumulation by the number of children 
parents have over their lifetime.   As shown in the top panel, the most striking feature is 
that households without children accumulate assets more slowly in early years, but then 
at a much more rapid pace so that by their late forties, households with no children have 
more assets on average.  In fact, at young ages households with no children have the 
fewest assets, but by their late forties, these households have the highest average asset 
level.  The general pattern for households with children is to accumulate assets at a 
quickening pace until their early thirties, to slow asset accumulation during their thirties, 
but then resume at a more rapid pace in their mid-forties.  Households with 1-3 children 
have significantly more assets than those with four or five children.  This pattern is 
similarly repeated when separating households with a college degree from those without 
as is done in the lower two panels of figure 4.  The observed asset accumulation pattern is 
certainly consistent with households saving more to cover the cost of children and then 
slowing their asset accumulation while incurring expenses associated with children. 
 While this is certainly optional for parents to help pay for a college education, 
most households do contribute toward their children’s education and the amounts are 
significant.  Table 3 presents information about the amount of money families spend on 
their children’s college education.  For the entire sample, 81.7 percent of households with 
children attending college helped pay for college.  Furthermore, the average per-year 
contribution made by those who did help financially support their children was $5,230 in 
1999 dollars.  The percentage or parents who help support their children in college rises 
to just under 95 percent for households with a college degree.  Even for households with 
no more than a high school degree, the percentage remains high at 67.7 percent.  The 
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average amount contributed for those families who helped pay for college is $6,690 for 
households with a college degree and $3,033 for those without.  This is a per-year, per-
child figure.  Clearly, this indicates a significant amount of money, especially when 
multiplied over several years and several children.  This data comes from parents who 
answered affirmatively in the surveys that they had a child in college within the last 12 
months, and if so how much they contributed toward that child’s education.  Given the 
biennial collection of the data, this allows for some gaps in off years when children might 
attend college some, but no information is colleted on how much parents helped to pay.  
However, that should not significantly change the results in Table 3.     
 Table 4 shows the distribution of education attainment for children.  Overall, 21.9 
percent receive a four-year degree or more, 35.73 percent attend some college but do not 
earn a four-year degree and 42.37 percent do not attend college at all.  For households 
with a college degree, the percentage of children earning a four-year degree or more rises 
to 37.34 percent and only 23.10 percent do not attend college at all.  This relationship 
between parents and children’s education has been consistently documented (see 
Haveman and Wolfe 1995 for a review).  Furthermore, as noted above, parents with a 
college degree make larger contributions toward helping pay for a college education, 
which should also increase number of children with a college degree (as is found to be 
the case in Keane and Wolpin 2001). 
 
5. Results 
5.1  Parameter Estimates 
The estimated parameters of the model are reported in table 5.  There are a total of 48 
parameters estimated here.  While that is a large number of parameters, the data consist 
of over 3,139 household-period observations.  These are then fit to the various choices in 
the model including a choice of zero to four children in each of the first three periods, an 
amount to contribute toward education for the fourth period of children’s lives, and an 
amount to save in each period.  Moreover, the latter two are allowed to be continuous 
choice variables. 
 Several of the estimated parameters are of direct interest by themselves.  In the 
specified CRRA utility function for consumption, γ is the coefficient of relative risk 
 33
aversion, 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and γ+1 is the coefficient of 
relative prudence (Kimball, 1990).  The estimate for γ, the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, is 2.8.  This in turn implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.357 
and a coefficient of prudence is 3.8.  While prior estimates relative risk aversion and 
elasticity of substitution vary quite a bit, these estimates are in line with typical estimates.  
Hubbard et al. (1994) discuss previous estimates when deciding on what value to use in 
their analysis and conclude that a typical estimate for the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is 3, which is what they proceed to use.  The estimate here, while indicating 
slightly more willingness to make intertemporal substitutions, is very similar.   Looking 
at other studies indicates that if anything the estimate here of the willingness to make 
intertemporal substitution is on the low end.  Hurd (1989) estimates intertemporal 
substitution of between 0.89 and 1.4.  Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of 0.5 which implies a much lower coefficient of relative prudence 
of 1.5.  They attribute this to their specific limits on borrowing constraints keeping those 
with steep earnings profiles, but still facing earnings uncertainty, from borrowing heavily 
as opposed to relying on a high degree of prudence.  The estimate here suggests more 
prudence even with borrowing constraints.  The difference is presumably a result of the 
modeling of the endogenous fertility choice and that the desire to afford children and  
spending on education provide a possible explanation for the greater prudence.  The 
decision to have a child locks the household into some additional expenses for three 
periods, and the spending on education is a one-period chance that the household cannot 
intertemporally substitute into other periods.  Both of these factors would seem to 
encourage a greater degree of prudence for households. 
 The estimated parameters for the children’s educational outcome suggest that both 
parental offers for financing and the parents’ education level both have a sizeable impact 
on the outcome.  The marginal effects indicated by the ordered probit estimates are 
nonlinear and themselves functions of the values of parental contributions and education 
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levels.8  Table 6 shows some of the predicted probabilities for a child’s education for 
different levels of parental contribution and education, along with the marginal impact of 
an additional dollar on the probabilities.  Note that these predictions are drawn just from 
the ordered probit and not model simulation predictions, which allow for the endogenous 
choice of the offers.  For evaluating the impact of the level of parents’ education, the 
marginal impact can be seen by comparing the change in the predicted probabilities.  
However, again the marginal effect is contingent on the contribution amount.  Evaluated 
at the entire sample average contribution of $4,273 per year, children from a household 
with a parent with a college degree have a 15 percent probability of no college education 
versus 37 percent for those from a household without a parent with college degree, a 
difference of 22 percentage points.  The probabilities of a four-year college degree are 43 
percent versus 18 percent, an increase in 25 percentage points for children with a college-
educated parent.  The gap is even wider when factoring in the fact that more educated 
households also contribute more money toward their children’s education.  For example, 
the probability of a child having no college education is only 9 percent for households 
with a college-educated parent contributing $6,336 per year (the average for higher-
educated households).  The probability of no college education for a child from a 
household without a college-educated parent is 45 percent when contributing $2,054, the 
average for such households.  This is a gap of 36 percentage points.  Evaluated at these 
offer amounts, the probabilities of a child with a four-year degree are 54 percent versus 
14 percent, a difference of 40 percentage points. 
 The parameters estimates also indicate a sizeable impact from parental 
contributions to the educational attainment of their children.  The marginal impact of 
additional parental contributions changes as the amount contributed changes.  The 
marginal impact also differs between households with a parent with a college degree and 
those without.   For example, an additional dollar reduces the probability of no college 
education for a child by as much as 0.007 percentage points to 0.001 percentage points 
for college-educated households.  So that means an additional $1,000 contributed per 
8 The marginal effect of variable, xxk ∈ , on the probability that certain choice j is selected is given 
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year will lower the probability of a child getting no college education by 1 to 7 percent.  
The impact is the greatest for college-educated households when they are not 
contributing, and then steadily falls for these households, which is partly because the 
probability of no college falls so low.  This marginal effect is smaller at first for 
households without a college-educated parent, but remains more stable as more is 
offered.  Still, additional dollars have a decreasing marginal impact.  For example, the 
marginal effect of the first dollar offered reduces the probability of no college by 0.004 
percentage points and this slows reduces to 0.002 as parents offer more.  At the same 
time, an additional dollar offered increases the probability of a four-year degree, but this 
marginal impact rises and then eventually falls as well.  For example the marginal impact 
on the probability of a four-year degree for college-educated households begins at 0.005 
for the first dollar, rises to over 0.0065 and then falls back below 0.005.  Again a similar 
pattern is true for less educated households, but the marginal impact is smaller, and hence 
more stable, rising from 0.0019, up to 0.0026 and then falling slightly.  The marginal 
impact on the probability of some college education starts positive and then eventually 
becomes negative as the probability of a four-year degree grows.  So, in summary, the 
parameter estimates indicate a sizeable impact of both parents’ education and the offer to 
help pay for college on the probability a child receives a college education.  Furthermore, 
this impact is magnified by the fact that the marginal impact of an additional dollar is 
often larger for educated households, at least at low spending levels, though the impact 
diminishes as more is spent for all households. 
 A few other parameter estimates are worth mentioning at this point.  The discount 
rate for a six-year period, δ, is estimated at 0.8797 which is the equivalent of 0.979 per 
year.  This is actually less discounting than would be implied by the real interest rate, 
which is set at three percent.  The child-cost estimates are $77,228 per six years for 
college-educated households and $41,782 for those without a college degree, both large 
amounts for the respective households to cover.  Lastly, the estimated taste parameters 
for number of children and for children’s education, while not of interest in size 
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themselves, are suggestive in their relation between college-educated households and 
less-educated households.  The increase in utility from an additional child is greater for 
less-educated households, and does not decline as rapidly with increasing numbers of 
children.  The utility of additional education is also surprisingly greater for less-educated 
households, but in this case the decrease in marginal utility is more rapid for those 
households.  This may be necessary to get enough college spending from those 
households, while college-educated households both have more money and the 
probability of their children getting a college degree is much higher.  
 
5.2  Model Fit 
Before turning to a further discussion of the implications of the model on educational 
savings policies and the fertility decisions in subsequent sections, I now turn to providing 
some information on the fit of the model.  Table 7 presents some summary statistics for 
the actual data and a simulated sample of 10,000 households based on the model 
parameter estimates.  As the table shows, the model does well in matching most average 
characteristics in the data.  In general the model solidly captures the increasing 
accumulation of assets.  The model does slightly understate the average assets levels for 
younger households, overstate them in middle age and understate them again as 
households move into their fifties.  This is true for both college-educated and less-
educated households as is shown graphically in figure 5.  The averages are not too far off 
in general.  At most the means are off by 15 percent, for college educated households 
when they ages 24-29 and 10 percent for households without a college degree when they 
are ages 42-47.  The remainder of the time the average is off by less than 10 percent. 
 Additional information on the fit of predicted asset levels is provided in figures 6-
8.  Figure 6 shows the predicted asset accumulation for households broken down by both 
education levels and number of children.  The model clearly captures the qualitative 
trends seen for the actual data in figure 4.  Households with no kids save less in early 
years, but have the highest asset levels by their fifties.  Households with children save 
more early on, but have lower average asset levels by their fifties, especially those with 
four or five children.  Figure 7 shows separate asset accumulation panels for households 
with different numbers of children, comparing the paths of the actual data and the 
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simulated data.   Again the qualitative trends are clearly captured, including the 
changing pace of asset accumulation.  However, especially for households with 4 and 5 
children, the actual levels are over or understated by a noticeable amount.  However, the 
sample size for these households is definitely smaller. Figure 8 plot the cumulative 
distribution of assets for households in different age brackets and different education 
levels.  As seen here, when looks at all households, the general trend is for the predicted 
data to be more disperse than the actual data.  That is the predicted distribution has fatter 
tails. 
 The model does a reasonably good job in matching the percentage of children 
with different levels of education.  For example, for households with a college-educated 
parent the model overstates the percentage with no college education by just 0.9 percent, 
understates the percentage with some college by just 0.56 percent and understates the 
percentage with a 4 year degree by just 0.34 percent.  For households without a parent 
with a college degree, the predicted percentages are equally good.  For all households 
together, however, the percentages are off by a bit more, largely because the model does 
a slightly less good job with predicting the relative number of children in households of 
different education levels, as will be mentioned in more detail below.  Still, the simulated 
sample only understates the percentage with no college degree by 1.78 percent, overstates 
the percentage with some college by .45 percent and overstates the percentage with a 
four-year degree by 1.33 percent. 
 The model simulation matches average amounts contributed by households to 
their children’s college education quite well.  As table 7 shows, overall the simulated 
sample average is $4,364 per-child, per-year, while the actual data average is just slightly 
less at $4,273.  For households with a college degree the average is higher, at $6,390 for 
the simulated data and $6,336 for the actual data, but again very little difference.  The 
same is true for less educated households where the average in the simulated sample is 
$2,185 versus $2,054 in the actual data.  However, some distributional aspects of these 
offers are clearly not matched as well.  The model noticeably underpredicts the 
percentage of parents actually spending money on their children’s education.  The model 
predicts 70.69 percent of households contributing to their children’s education, while the 
actual data show 81.71 percent contributing.  This discrepancy shows up in both 
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household education levels:  61.87 percent in the model simulation versus 67.72 
percent in the data for less-educated households, and 82.80 percent versus 94.71 percent 
for households with a college degree.  These lower percentages contributing are 
accompanied by a wider dispersion of offers, particularly on the high end, within the 
simulated data versus the actual data. 
 When looking at the number of children, the model again does fairly well in 
predicting the average number of children, but again misses a bit more on some aspects 
of the broader distribution.  The average number of children in the data is 2.31 versus 
2.28 in the simulated data9.  Beyond just the overall average, the model also does well in 
matching the average number of children born at different ages for a household.  The 
averages for mothers aged 18-23 years old, 24-29 years old and 30-35 years old are 
0.896, 0.890 and 0.527 respectively in the actual data.  The model simulation matches 
this quite will with averages of 0.887, 0.876 and 0.520.  The fit is similarly good when 
looking separately ad households of different education levels, as is also shown in table 7. 
 
 
6. Education Policy Simulations 
Given the model estimates, policy experiments can be made to evaluate the impact of 
policies that would impact the amount that parents contribute to their children’s education 
or the impact that these contributions have.  As was discussed in section 2, , there are a 
variety of educational reforms aimed at making a college education more affordable 
and/or helping parents save for their children’s education.  The section here uses a 
simulation of 10,000 households, proportioned by education as is in the data, to examine 
how their savings and educational contribution decisions would change in the presence of 
policies similar to an increase direct college subsidies, a tax credit, a tax credit with an 
income limit and the introduction of a tax-advantaged educational savings account.  The 
change in the distribution of education levels of children is also examined.  While the tax 
reform act of 1997 did introduce and/or expand policies such as these, assuming that the 
9 Remember that the data here are limited to married families with a stable marriage, so these are higher 
than the total population. 
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policies were largely unexpected by households, the households used to estimate the 
model certainly were not impacted by them over their life-cycle paths. 
 The specific policy adjustments that are considered are as follows.  The first is a 
$1,000 education grant.  This appears in the model as a default offer to all children, that is 
the amount when parents offer nothing, of $1,000 instead of nothing.  The second policy 
is a tax credit to parents for all money spent on their children’s education.  In the model 
this basically means that parents don’t actually have to pay out part of their offered 
contribution when children go to school, and the savings is equal to their marginal tax 
rate times the contribution.  This is complicated by the fact that the original model 
embeds the changing tax code and tax brackets throughout the lives of the households.  In 
the experiment I just use the federal 2001 tax brackets for the marginal rates on married 
households filing jointly.10   As such, the credit is really like a partial rebate on your 
college expenditures that depends on the amount you contribute and your current income.  
The third policy is this same credit, but with a cap at $40,000 ($10,000 for four years) on 
the amount of contributions eligible for the credit.  The final policy is the addition of an 
education savings account.  For this experiment, instead of just one type of assets, there 
are now two types of savings: regular savings and educational savings.  The educational 
savings account is allowed to grow tax-free and the earnings are not taxable as long as 
they are spent on education.  Any amount not spent on education becomes taxable.  Since 
there are no taxes directly in the model, this tax-free savings is modeled as an increase in 
the return on savings equal to the amount of the default return times the parents’ marginal 
tax rate.  Parents can only contribute to these accounts if they have children and cannot 
contribute more than $7,500 per child per year.   When the child turns 18, which is period 
4 in the model, the amount in the account must either be contributed toward education 
(which is obviously contingent on the child attending college) or a penalty is paid.  The 
penalty is an amount equal to the current marginal tax rate of the parents times any 
unspent balance in the account.  The addition of the second asset class does create an 
additional state variable in the model and it is a second continuous variable.  This creates 
10 These are 15% for income less than $45,200, 28% for income between $45,200 and $109,250, 31% for 
income between $109,250 and $166,500, 36% for income between $166,500 and $297,350 and 39.6% for 
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a much larger state space across which the problem must be solved, thought the 
extended model does not need to be estimated, just get an obtainable solution.  The same 
solution procedure is used as before, except that now the Keane-Wolpin smoothing 
regressions are now applied across both asset classes. 
 Table 10 presents the results of the policy experiments.  The reported amounts are 
the sample statistics for the appropriate simulated data set.  The base simulation is the 
original model as estimated and discussed above.  The $1,000 grant has the smallest 
impact on the average amount contributed by parents, and the average is lower than in the 
base simulation.  However, that is to be expected since every child is in effect already 
receiving a $1,000 per year contribution, and the marginal impact of contributions is 
decreasing as contributions increase.  Interestingly, though, the average contribution from 
parents does decline by a full $1,000, so on net more is being contributed in total toward 
education.  For all households, the average contribution falls by $681 so the net amount 
from parents and the grant increases by $319.  For households with a college degree the 
average contribution by parents declines by $573, indicating an increase in total 
contributions including the grant of $427.  Similarly for parents without a college degree, 
there is decline of parental contributions of $800, which means an increase in total 
contribution of $200.  The percentage of parents contributing also falls noticeably, but 
again 100 percent of children are receiving a $1,000 contribution from the new grant.  So 
while only 55 percent of parents contribute above and beyond the grant, a decline of just 
over 15 percentage points from the percentage contributing before the grant, there is still 
a sizeable impact on the distribution of education outcomes for children.  The percentage 
of children with no college education falls by almost five percent, from 40.6 percent to 
35.8 percent.  The percentage with some college education rises by 1.5 percent, from 36.2 
percent to 37.7 percent and the percentage with a college degree rises by 3.3 percent from 
23.23 percent to 26.54 percent.  Furthermore, the improvement is actually greater for 
children whose parents have no college education, even though the grant itself was not 
means tested.  For these children, the percentage receiving no college education actually 
falls by 6.3 percent, from 52.4 percent to 46.1 percent. 
 
income above $297,350.  Since the income in the model is over six year periods, I divide this by six to get 
the associated tax bracket.  
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 The tax credit generates a larger increase in average contributions than the grant 
and also increases the percentage of parents contributing, but the net impact on 
educational outcomes is less.  The average contribution rises to $5,963, an increase of 
almost $1,600.  This is true for households of both education levels, those with a college 
degree show a $1,509 increase and those without a college degree show a $1,681 
increase.  Furthermore the percentage of parents contributing rises from 70.69 percent to 
82.55 percent.  The increase is the greatest among parents without a college degree, 
where the percentage contributing rises from 61.87 percent to 80.16 percent, while the 
increase is just 3 percentage points, from 82.8 percent to 85.8 percent, for parents with a 
college degree.  This suggests that while the credit did increase the amount of support 
from college educated parents who gave support, it did not greatly increase the 
percentage contributing.  Certainly this is partly due to the already high percentage of 
educated parents who give support. 
 While the amounts spent by parents did go up on average, and the increase was 
greater than with the grant experiment, the impact on educational outcomes was less.  
The percentage receiving no college degree did fall, but only by 2.6 percent (from 40.59 
percent to 37.99 percent), which is noticeably less than the 4.8 percent decline with the 
grant.  The associated increase in the percentages with some college and a four-year 
degree are0 .47 percentage points and 2.13 percentage points respectively.  Compared to 
the grant, these increases are smaller, though the relative shift toward a four-year degree 
is more.  This is presumably due to the fact that the grant is available to all children, 
which in effect ups the contribution percentage to 100 percent.  Coupling this with the 
fact that the estimated marginal impact of the offer is generally decreasing, this can 
explain the superior performance of the grant.  Interestingly, the simulated expected per-
household cost of the grant is lower than the lost tax revenue from the credit.  The 
expected cost of the grant comes to $4,146 per household, while the expected credit costs 
are $5,775 per household.  Imposing the high, $10,000 per year, cap on the amount 
eligible for the credit does reduce this cost to $5,364.  The cap also lowers the average 
contribution by almost $300, when compared to having the credit without the cap in 
place.  However, the cap made no significant difference to the percentage of parents 
contributing, nor on the distribution of educational outcomes.  For example, the cap only 
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reduced the decline in the percentage of children with no college education by 0.16 
percentage points.  This is because with the cap so high, it is not a factor in getting people 
to contribute, and it only reduces contributions for those families who already contributed 
so much that the marginal impact of the declining offers is not large. 
 One interesting result from these first three experiments is that there is virtually 
no impact on the number of children that families have or on their asset accumulation 
paths at younger ages.  The average number of children iss exactly the same before and 
after the tax credit experiments, and rose only by 0.001 in the grant experiment.  
Furthermore, when looking at asset accumulation of parents up to age 41, there is not 
much difference at all from the base simulation.  The grant did lower the averages a tiny 
amount ($6 for ages 24-29, $11 for ages 30-35 and $45 for ages 36-41) but this is by less 
than 0.05 percent in each instance.  In the later years, asset levels are higher than the base 
simulation, because parents are spending less on education, but again, while larger, the 
increase is not great.  For example, by ages 48-53, the average asset level increases by 
$2,224 or 1 percent.  While the pattern of increasing and decreasing is different for the 
credit experiment, the size of the changes is again very small.  Average assets increase by 
$3 both with and without the cap for households ages 24-29, by $16 and $18 with the cap 
and without for ages 30-35, and $66 and $69 with and without the cap for ages 36-41.  At 
later ages the assets are lower that the base simulation, as parents spend more on their 
children’s education.  However, even by age 48-53, the average assets are only about 0.5 
percent lower.  The pattern here suggest that while there is a relationship between 
income, fertility, savings and educational spending, as is seen in the asset accumulation 
patterns shown in the data and the results section (see figure 6 for example), these 
particular policies do not have a sizeable impact on the fertility or savings decisions. 
 The education savings account, on the other hand, does have an influence on 
fertility and savings, as well as parental contributions and the educational outcomes of 
children.  This experiment shows the largest increase in contributions from parents.  Over 
all households, the average parental contribution increases $2,072, to $6,436, from $4364 
in the base simulation.  Surprisingly, the increase is actually greater for households where 
neither parent has a college degree.  For college-educated parents the increase is $1549, 
up to $7939, while for those without a college degree the increase is $2,233, up to an 
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average of $4,418.   This result is most likely driven by the fact that the marginal 
impact of additional contributions is decreasing.  Since more of the lower-educated 
households are not contributing or saving as much, the marginal impact of their increases 
in offers is greater, so a lesser marginal incentive to save is needed.  Certainly this result 
is not what is expected of a policy that is often presumed to benefit wealthier households 
more.  Both groups of households also see an increase the percentage of parents 
contributing:  from 82.80 percent to 90.21 percent for parents with a college degree and 
from 61.87 percent to 74.10 percent for parents without a college degree.  With greater 
contributions and an overall parental contribution rate of 82.56 percent, the percentage of 
children with no college education fall by 6 percent, to 35 percent from 41 percent, and 
the percentage with a four-year degree rises to 27.92 percent from 23.23 percent.  This 
improvement is even greater than that from the grant experiment.  However, the cost is 
also higher.  Here the cost is lost revenue from taxable earnings on the education savings.  
The cost per household comes to almost $8,000.  However, much of this lost revenue is 
on earning from savings that were not present from the base scenario, making this 
estimate hard to compare.  If the amount of savings is held to the base simulated levels, 
the lost revenue is just $2,593 per household. 
 The higher contributions, and the associated large cost in lost tax revenue, are due 
in large part to the fact that the education savings account experiment actually stimulates 
a large amount of new savings.  Unlike the other policy experiments done here, the 
education savings account greatly alters savings behavior.  Average savings for 
households increases by 20 percent by ages 24-29, 28 percent by ages 30-35 and still by 
16 percent for ages 46-41.  After that, assets levels are largely unchanged for ages 42-47 
and then actually one percent lower for ages 48-53.  This clearly indicates that there is 
additional savings, beyond the amount accounted for just by a higher return, and that it is 
used by families to help pay for their children’s education.  The average amounts in the 
education accounts are also shown in table 10.  While they are indeed greater than the 
increase in savings, especially in later years, they are also not just created from a shift of 
assets from traditional savings to the higher-return education savings accounts.  Along 
with the increase in savings, fertility rates also rise to where the average number of 
children 2.410, up from 2.282.  Again, this is presumably due to having access to the 
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improved return on savings along with the improved ability to have college-educated 
children. 
  
7.  Conclusion 
The model presented here gives structural estimates of dynamic, life-cycle model with 
the choices of having children, spending on children’s college education, and savings and 
consumption all made endogenously.  The model also allows for borrowing constraints, 
uncertain lifetime income, and allows for heterogeneity between parents with different 
levels of education.  The model is solved using backward induction and a regression 
smoothing procedure and is then model is then estimated with a simulated maximum 
likelihood procedure using data from the National Longitudinal Survey.  The estimated 
model is then used to run policy experiments to gauge the impact of several recently 
implemented programs to increase parental support for children’s education. 
 The estimates imply that there is a positive relationship between income, 
education, having children, and savings behavior.  Families with 3 or fewer save more at 
young ages than those without children, yet married couples without children have 
greater savings by the time they reach their mid-thirties.  The reason is the costs of not 
only raising children, which are estimated to by quite large, but also of helping to pay for 
a college education.  The model is able to capture the interactions more effectively than if 
fertility was the result of an exogenous process.  The model estimates that the fast 
majority of patents, over 70 percent, offer to aid in college expenses and that the average 
amount is significant, at over $4,000 per year, per child.  Furthermore, the size of the 
offer has a sizeable impact on the educational attainment of children.  For example, an 
additional $1,000 will reduce the probability a child receives no education by anywhere 
from 4 percent to 7 percent.  The marginal impact of this additional money is decreasing 
as the offer size increases, and the impact differs for parents with a college degree and 
those without a college degree.  Furthermore, the estimates indicate that children’s 
educational attainment is also directly influenced by the education level of parents. 
 The policy experiments examine the impact of an education grant/subsidy, tax 
breaks for education spending, and the creation of a targeted savings account.  The 
experiments suggest that a $1,000 grant available to all students and the creation of tax-
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free savings accounts with a limit of $7,500 a year both have a greater impact on 
education outcomes than the tax credit.  The grant is effective because it in essence 
increases the percentage of households offering support to 100%, and households do not 
decrease the amounts they offer beyond this by the full $1,000.  Furthermore, given that 
the initial money offered has the largest marginal impact, getting offer rates up is very 
beneficial.  The savings account, on the other hand, vastly raises the amount that parents 
offer.  This is because the return on using the accounts is higher.  Furthermore, the 
percentage of households making offers also rises substantially as the benefit of having 
children with post-secondary education becomes more attainable.  Interestingly, the 
greatest increase in both contributions and improving probabilities of receiving a college 
education are among lower educated households, even with the education savings 
account, which is not necessarily what is expected. 
 A number of limitation in the model used here still remain.  Several problems 
remain with how the model treats the actual education choice of children.  First, the 
education decisions of children are not modeled in a fundamental way.  Future work to 
include this decision more directly, and even perhaps worked into a cooperative or 
noncooperative framework with parents would allow for a better understanding of this 
process.  Futhermore, there is no allowance in the model for studying the choice of 
college to attend.  Other studies present evidence that there is substantial substitution, for 
example, between private and public four-year schools in response to price increases (see 
for example, Cameron and Heckman, 1999.)  The model here does not directly account 
for the price of college or the rise in college expenses and their impact.  These are just 
suppresses as part of the estimated outcome process.   In addition, there are no difference 
in the quality of college education here.  It is very likely that parental contributions may 
influence the “quality” of school attended.    Lastly, there is no direct accounting for the 
negative impact that greater parental assets and contributions might have on reducing 
financial aid that would otherwise be available.  In the estimation here, such effects are 
just evident in the falling marginal impact of parental contributions.  Allowing for these 
factors within a dynamic framework, and finding data rich enough to estimate the such a 
multi-faceted analysis, is clearly a challenge for future research.  
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SIZE AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
 Highest Grade Competed  
 High School   
  or less College All 
No. Obs. 311 245 556 
    
Children (mean) 2.395 2.208 2.313 
     Children born when 18-23 (mean) 1.225 0.478 0.896 
     Children born when 24-29 (mean) 0.826 0.971 0.890 
     Children born when 30-35 (mean) 0.344 0.759 0.527 
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TABLE 2 
NET ASSETS* 
Age     Mean    Percent Mean if 
(No. Obs.)     (Median)    Std. Dev.   Min.     Max. Negative Negative 
All        
18-23         4,290   10,330 -9,480      77,443    10.07   -1,172
(556)        (965)     
24-29       24,140   36,968 -12,776    297,912      8.81   -1,597
(556)    (12,342)     
30-35       59,858   74,375 -20,561    587,955      6.29   -2,685
(556)    (41,957)     
36-41       85,820 104,145 -28,095    673,160      7.01   -3,399
(556)    (56,331)     
42-47     131,628 148,201 -11,266  1,093,175      3.60   -1,965
(556)    (85,364)     
48-53     218,947 245,800 -18,950 1,196,500      1.89   -3,026
(318)  (133,470)     
54-59     263,326 298,600 -5,000 1,246,000      2.44   -1,620
(41)  (145,000)       
       
By Parents       
Education:       
High School       
or Less       
18-23         4,431 11,028 -8,617 77,443      9.32   -933
(311) (287)       
24-29       19,291 30,695 -10,029 196,752    10.61   -1,591
(311)      (5,628)       
30-35       45,943 61,429 -16,477 401,446      8.04   -2,391
(311)    (28,166)       
36-41       62,472 86,877 -28,095 661,441    10.29   -3,202
(311)    (38,024)       
42-47       89,729 111,792 -11,266 790,741      6.11   -1,908
(311)    (57,938)       
48-53     157,730 199,906 -10,000 1,126,000      1.62   -1,493
(185)    (85,000)       
54-59     174,348 237,751 -5,000 945,500      6.67   -1,620
(30)    (82,500)                
* 1999 dollars      continued…
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TABLE 2 
CONTINUED 
Age     Mean    Percent Mean if
(No. Obs.)     (Median)     Std. Dev.    Min.     Max. Negative Negative
By Parents        
Education:        
College        
18-23         4,111 9,391 -9,479 64,789    11.02   -1,657
(245)      (1,555)       
24-29       30,296 42,935 -12,776 297,913      6.53   -1,611
(245)    (17,887)       
30-35       77,523 85,017 -20,561 587,955      4.08   -3,673
(245)    (56,912)       
36-41     115,458 116,209 -27,462 673,160      2.86   -4,495
(245)    (80,958)       
42-47     184,814 170,301 -8,416 1,093,175      0.41   -2,872
(245)  (137,546)       
48-53     304,100 277,183 -18,950 1,196,500      2.26   -6,091
(133)  (213,700)       
54-59     505,996 322,794 144,000 1,246,000         -              -   
(11)  (456,000)                 
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TABLE 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD CHILDREN'S COLLEGE EDUCATION 
    Percent Mean if 
  No. Obs. Mean* Contributing Contributing* 
All 328      4,273         81.71           5,230  
By Parents Education:       
    High School or Less 158      2,054         67.72           3,033  
    College 170      6,336          94.71            6,690   
* 1999 dollars       
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TABLE 4 
CHILDREN'S EDUCATION ATTAINMENT 
    Percent 
 Percent Percent 4-year Degree 
  No College Some College or More 
All            42.37              35.73              21.90  
By Parents Education:     
    High School or Less            52.49              33.72              13.79  
    College            23.10               39.56               37.34   
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TABLE 5 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
         
Utility Function          
γ λ1c λ11c λ12c λ13c λ1h λ11h λ12h λ13h 
2.8263 0.8271a 5.3555a 5.4439a 6.0019a -0.2912a 5.9955a 8.6061a 1.7350a 
         
λ2c λ2h α1c α1h α2c α2h θ1c θ1h θ2c 
-0.6286a 0.1431a 0.0041a 0.0053a -0.3699b -0.5472b 0.0087a 0.0122a -0.5421b
         
θ2h        
-0.8246b        
         
         
Income                 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 
11.0244 0.3348 -0.0354 -0.1927 0.1684 -0.0065 0.9626 -0.2011 -0.3001 
         
bc bh        
0.9575 0.0088        
         
         
Children's Education             
µ1 µ2 κ1 κ2 κ3 κ4 κ5   
0.07189 1.2974 1.1023c -3.8649a 0.4040 0.7243c 0.1011a   
         
         
Error Distribution               
σc σn σe σic σih σretc σreth ση  
0.0101 7.9767a 1.3856c 0.7082 0.5182 42275 23275 0.0285  
         
         
Other Parameters               
δ ψc ψn       
0.8797 77228 41782       
                  
aParameter multiplied by 108       
bParameter multiplied by 1011       
cParameter multiplied by 1000       
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TABLE 6 
ESTIMATED EDUCATION PROBABILITIES BY PARENT CONTIBUTION AND EDUCATION
 Parental Contribution 
  $0  $2,054  $4,273  $6,336  $10,000 
Households with College Degree:      
     Prob(no college) 36.99% 24.47% 14.83% 9.04% 3.74%
          Marginal impact of $1 -0.000069 -0.000055 -0.000039 -0.000026 -0.000012
     Prob(some college) 44.43% 45.87% 42.38% 36.47% 25.15%
          Marginal impact of $1 0.000020 -0.000006 -0.000027 -0.000037 -0.000038
     Prob(4-year degree) 18.58% 27.66% 42.80% 54.49% 71.12%
          Marginal impact of $1 0.000049 0.000061 0.000065 0.000063 0.000050
      
High School Degree or Less:      
     Prob(no college) 52.87% 44.50% 37.12% 31.87% 25.98%
          Marginal impact of $1 -0.000044 -0.000040 -0.000035 -0.000031 -0.000023
     Prob(some college) 37.41% 41.65% 44.39% 45.59% 45.98%
          Marginal impact of $1 0.000025 0.000018 0.000010 0.000005 -0.000001
     Prob(4-year degree) 9.73% 13.85% 18.49% 22.54% 28.04%
          Marginal impact of $1 0.000019 0.000023 0.000025 0.000026 0.000024
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TABLE 7 
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SELECTED OUTCOMES 
    Actual  Predicted 
All Households:    
Assets* (mean by age):   
     24-29      24,140    22,292 
     30-35      59,858    57,925 
     36-41      85,820    86,193 
     42-47    131,628  138,729 
     48-53    218,947  215,224 
   
Children (mean)      2.313      2.282 
     Children born when 18-23 (mean)      0.896      0.887 
     Children born when 24-29 (mean)      0.890      0.876 
     Children born when 30-35 (mean)      0.527      0.520 
   
Contributions to College* (mean)      4,273      4,364 
Percent Contributing      81.71      70.69 
Childrens Education Attainment (percent):   
     No College      42.37      40.59 
     Some College      35.73      36.18 
     4-year degree or more       21.90      23.23 
   
By Education:   
Households with High School Degree or Less:   
Assets* (mean by age):   
     24-29      19,291 18,643 
     30-35      45,943 43,968 
     36-41      62,472 59,811 
     42-47      89,729 98,315 
     48-53    157,730 155,317 
   
Children (mean)      2.395      2.370 
     Children born when 18-23 (mean)      1.225      1.235 
     Children born when 24-29 (mean)      0.826      0.804 
     Children born when 30-35 (mean)      0.344      0.331 
   
Contributions to College* (mean)      2,054      2,185 
Percent Contributing      67.72      61.87 
Childrens Education Attainment (percent):   
     No College      52.49      52.43 
     Some College      33.72      34.23 
     4-year degree or more      13.79      13.34 
* 1999 dollars   continued…
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TABLE 7 
CONTINUED 
     Actual  Predicted 
Households with College Degree:     
Assets* (mean by age):     
     24-29      30,296 25,654 
     30-35      77,523 75,642 
     36-41    115,458 119,681 
     42-47    184,814 190,031 
     48-53    304,100 300,348 
   
Children (mean)      2.208      2.117 
     Children born when 18-23 (mean)      0.478      0.445 
     Children born when 24-29 (mean)      0.971      0.967 
     Children born when 30-35 (mean)      0.759      0.759 
   
Contributions to College* (mean)      6,336      6,390 
Percent Contributing      94.71      82.80 
Childrens Education Attainment (percent):   
     No College      23.10      24.00 
     Some College      39.56      39.00 
     4-year degree or more      37.34      37.00  
* 1999 dollars     
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TABLE 8 
POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
      Credit  Ed. Sav.
     Base    Grant    Credit   w/ Limit   Account
All Households:      
Parent Contributions to College (mean)     4,364     3,605     5,963      5,610      6,436 
Percent of Parents Contributing     70.69     54.51     82.55      82.50      82.56 
Childrens Education (percent): 
     No College     40.59     35.80     37.99      38.15      34.91 
     Some College     36.18     37.66     36.65      36.61      37.17 
     4-year degree or more     23.23      26.54     25.36      25.24      27.92 
Children (mean)     2.282     2.285     2.283      2.283      2.410 
Total Assets (mean by age): 
     24-29     22,292   22,286   22,295    22,295    26,812 
     30-35     57,925   57,914   57,941    57,943    73,905 
     36-41     86,193   86,148   86,259    86,262   100,009 
     42-47    138,729  139,246  138,245   138,306   139,286 
     48-53    219,224  221,448  218,627   218,942   216,791 
Educational Savings (mean by age): 
     24-29        1,360 
     30-35      13,759 
     36-41      31,525 
     42-47      51,321 
     48-53      45,756 
 
By Household Education: 
High School Degree or Less: 
Parent Contributions to College (mean)     2,185     1,385     3,866      3,765      4,418 
Percent of Parents Contributing     61.87     43.72     80.16      80.06      74.10 
Childrens Education (percent): 
     No College     52.43      46.10     49.29      49.43      48.03 
     Some College     34.23     37.13     35.30      35.19      35.91 
     4-year degree or more     13.34     16.77     15.41      15.38      16.06 
Children (mean)     2.370     2.373      2.371      2.371      2.644 
Total Assets (mean by age): 
     24-29   19,643 19,647   19,647 19,648 29,878
     30-35   43,968 43,964   43,990 43,993 57,222
     36-41   59,811 59,760   59,921 59,928 76,645
     42-47   98,315 98,861    97,553 97,649 102,638
     48-53   155,317 156,567  153,905 154,082 144,641
Educational Savings (mean by age): 
     24-29   1,185
     30-35   11,267
     36-41   26,002
     42-47   46,814
     48-53      42,370
    continued… 
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TABLE 8 
CONTINUED 
      Credit Ed. Sav.
     Base   Grant    Credit   w/ Limit  Account
Households with College Degree:      
Parent Contributions to College (mean)     6,390     5,817     7,899      7,548      7,939 
Percent of Parents Contributing     82.80     69.32     85.84      85.84      90.21 
Childrens Education(percent):  
     No College     24.00     21.48     22.31      22.46      20.16 
     Some College     39.00     38.40     38.51      38.59     39.20 
     4-year degree or more     37.00     40.12     39.18      38.95      40.64 
Children (mean)     2.117     2.118     2.117      2.117      2.223 
Total Assets (mean by age):  
     24-29   25,654 25,656   25,656 25,657 27,011
     30-35   75,642 75,624   75,650 75,651 94,099
     36-41   119,681 119,644  119,692 119,690 128,734
     42-47   190,031 190,511  189,898 189,916 195,500
     48-53   300,348 303,807  300,783 301,274 280,819
Educational Savings (mean by age):  
     24-29         1,816 
     30-35       18,531 
     36-41       38,532 
     42-47       57,041 
     48-53           50,168 
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ACTUAL AND PREDICTED MEAN ASSET ACCUMULATION                           
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                                            FIGURE 3                                       
SIMULATED ASSET ACCUMULATION BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN                                   
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